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CAPS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES AND THE
FEMALE PLAINTIFF: HEEDING THE WARNING SIGNS
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law currently faces the challenge of solving what many
believe is a liability crisis.' While many solutions have been pro-
posed, the possibility of placing caps on awards for noneconomic
damages has remained particularly enticing.2 Nevertheless, the ef-
fects of this proposal must be examined. Because of the-potentially
negative impact of such caps on female plaintiffs, a group histori-
cally burdened by the tort system,3 proponents of damage caps
should examine the potential effects of this reform prior to its
implementation.
Emotional injuries have long been disfavored by the courts.'
As a result, women, who have traditionally been associated with
these injuries,' often have their claims marginalized by the tort
system. By marginalizing women's claims, courts have disregarded
the merits of the claims and, instead, have emphasized such extrin-
sic factors as the purported character of the victim in order to
portray the claim as undeserving of compensation.6 As caps on
noneconomic damages are part of a current tort reform movement
that continues to disfavor emotional injuries, women suffer. Finally,
noneconomic caps deserve serious scrutiny because women already
receive much lower jury awards than men.7
This Note is divided into three sections. The first examines
the movement for tort reform, particularly current support for and
1. See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
3. See infra part InI.
4. See infra part Ill.
5. See infra part W.A.
6. See infra part IW.A.
7. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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opposition to caps on noneconomic damages. The second section
discusses ways in which the tort system operates to marginalize
emotional injury claims. The third section analyzes proposals for
tort reform that include caps for noneconomic damages. This analy-
sis demonstrates that the current movement merely echoes past
theories used by courts to deny compensation for emotional injury.
The last section concludes that caps on noneconomic damages have
the potential to create a disproportionately negative effect on wom-
en.
II. CURRENT MOVEMENT FOR TORT REFORM
The tort crisis has inspired the current movement for tort
reform.' The crisis may be described as the difficulty faced by
public and private businesses in obtaining liability insurance due to
increasing insurance rates and the decreasing availability of cover-
age.9 This difficulty stems from increases in both the number of
tort claims and the amount of damage awards."
8. The premise that a tort crisis exists is itself controverted. See Elliot M. Blake,
Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an In-
formation Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 402 (1988) (finding evidence to support the no-
tion that a tort crisis exists is severely limited by the fact that no "effective, neutral and
publicly accessible method for systematic collection and analysis of data" exists). One
commentator notes that "[i]nsurers have the advantage of easy access to data which, as a
practical matter, is impossible for industry outsiders to meaningfully evaluate." Teresa M.
Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303, 309 n.30
(1991) (quoting Blake, supra, at 426). Some publicized data misrepresents facts by focus-
ing only on the most outrageous jury verdicts and extreme consequences. Blake, supra, at
405; see also Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crises-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443, 445 (1987) ("Astronomic jury awards constantly are publicized by the media
. ... ). As a result, there may in fact be great problems with the tort system, but "there
is no evidence on which to base an evaluation of these claims, and what attempts law-
makers are making to address the problem are being made in the dark." Blake, supra, at
403.
Most recently, Michael Saks called into question the concern over a tort crisis. Mi-
chael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1992) ("Much discussion of the
tort litigation system consists of conclusory assertions, unsupported by evidence."). Specifi-
cally, addressing the issue of damages, Saks found that available data is insufficient to
support general conclusions about award patterns. Id. at 1245. Finally, he concluded: "But
at the end of the day, these assertions [of tort crisis and runaway damages] are hollow
conclusions, offered without evidence to sustain them." Id. at 1158-59.
9. See Kathryn L. Vezina, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Caps on Tort Dam-
ages: Is Tort Reform the Dragon Slayer or Is It the Dragon, 42 ME. L. REv. 219, 220
(1990) (describing the difficulty reported by these businesses in obtaining liability. insur-
ance).
10. Id.
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The tort crisis emerged in two phases. During the mid-1970's,
reformers focused on the problems associated with medical mal-
practice insurance. t' This first phase of the crisis arose as a result
of the dramatic increase in physicians' insurance rates between
1960 and 1970.12 Research indicates that rates for non-surgical
physicians increased 540.8%, while rates for surgical physicians
increased 949.2%.' Furthermore, accompanying hospital premiums
increased 262.7%.' The second wave in the tort crisis came in
the mid-1980's, when other business professionals, such as day
care centers and architects, found liability insurance difficult to
obtain."
State legislatures have proposed various solutions to the tort
crisis. 6 Proposals include eliminating joint and several liability,
allowing periodic payments of future economic losses, reducing
awards by deducting collateral sources of compensation received
for the same injury and scheduling contingency fees. 7 Frequently,
the proposed solution has been a statutory limit on tort damages.'
Damages for personal injury claims can be divided into two
broad categories. The first category is composed of economic dam-
ages, which compensate the party for out-of-pocket costs like medi-
cal expenses, as well as for lost earning capacity and lost time at
11. Id.
12. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Cri-
sis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REv. 759, 759 (1977).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 760.
15. Marco de Sa e Silva, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Washington's Limit
on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and Death, 63 WASH. L. REV.
653, 655 (1988); see also Jay Cohen, State Debate on Capping Non-Economic Damages
is Far from Resolution, NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1992, at 41, 41 (discussing state legislatures'
concern with the broader aspects of tort liability as evidenced by the fact that by 1986,
21 states had enacted damage caps that often went beyond the medical malpractice arena).
16. Some commentators, however, claim that the tort crisis is not necessarily a bad
thing. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 8, at 446 ("[T]ort claims do not create liability costs,
they merely shift them from victims to tortfeasors. It is the tortfeasors who create liability
costs by injuring victims. . . . If liability costs are high, it is because injuries are fre-
quent and serious.") (emphasis and footnote omitted).
17. Janai M. Powell, Casenote, Challenging the Constitutionality of Non-economic Dam-
age Caps: Boyd v. Bulala and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 24 WILLAMETE L. REV.
821, 821 (1988).
18. David J. Wiggins & Robert S. Caldwell, Liability-Limiting Legislation: An Imper-
missible Intrusion into the Jury's Right to Decide, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 723, 723 (1986);
see also Cohen, supra note 15, at 41 (citing damage caps as a central component of the
tort reform battle); Redish, supra note 12, at 761 (viewing the placement of caps on
damages as one of "[tihe most common legislative proposals" to deal with the medical
malpractice problem).
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work.19 The second category can be classified as noneconomic
damages.0 This category includes damages for pain and physical,
mental, or emotional suffering,2' as well as punitive damages.'
While some noneconomic damages may be considered a recent
phenomenon, all American jurisdictions have upheld damages that
are designed to compensate for nonpecuniary losses.' Commenta-
tors find that "[pihysical pain and attendant suffering have for
centuries been recognized as legitimate elements of damages"'24
and, as such, have clearly won a place in legal theory and prac-
tice.' Moreover, "[i]t cannot be doubted that damages for pain
and suffering are among the very real damages suffered by a tort
victim."26 As a result, courts have been willing to expand the
scope of noneconomic losses.27
19. Kyle R. Crowe. Note, The Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss: Should
Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA
L. REv. 1275, 1276 (1990).
20. For a representative statutory definition, see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West
Supp. 1992) ("'[N]oneconomic damages' means moneys intended to compensate for pain
and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment; worry; mental distress; noneconomic effects of
disability including loss of enjoyment of the normal activities, benefits and pleasures of
life and loss of mental or physical health, well-being or bodily functions; loss of consor-
tium, society and companionship; or loss of love and affection.").
21. Edward C. Martin, Limiting Damages for Pain and Suffering: Arguments Pro and
Con, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 317. 318 (1986). Mental and emotional suffering includes
"factors, such as fear, anxiety, worry, embarrassment, and humilitation." Id. at 319 (foot-
notes omitted). Other related types of mental or emotional suffering include cancerphobia,
id. at 320, and loss of enjoyment of life. Crowe, supra note 19, at 1276-77. Damages for
loss of enjoyment of life are called hedonic damages. Id. at 1278-79. For an example of
hedonic damages, see, e.g., Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 166 N.W.2d 541, 545-46 (Mich.
1968) (allowing recovery for loss of enjoyment for eating applesauce when "a plain-
tiff . . . can convince a jury that the food product he consumed was inedible and in con-
sequence he no longer enjoys eating it"). Courts have varied in treating these hedonic
damages as a component of pain and suffering or as a separate entity. Crowe, supra note
19, at 1277. Total estimates of hedonic damages have ranged from $450,000 to
$13,400,000 in 1989 dollars. WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAP-
PENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 171 (1991).
22. The Tort Working Group includes punitive damages in the category of
noneconomic damages. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY
CRISIS 81 (1987). The rationale is that punitive damages do not compensate a plaintiff for
out-of-pocket costs, but rather that such damages originated as a means to punish
wrongdoers and appease their victims. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 132 (1988) (quoting
Judge Traynor).
23. Martin, supra note 21, at 317-18.
24. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and
Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 911 (1989).
25. Id. at 935.
26. Jerry J. Phillips, To Be or Not to Be: Reflections on Changing Our Tort System,
46 MD. L. REv. 55, 60 (1986).
27. Martin, supra note 21, at 320 (discussing compensation for loss of enjoyment of
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Generally, proposals for statutory limits on tort damages oper-
ate generally in two ways. The first type of cap limits the total
amount of economic and noneconomic damages that a plaintiff may
receive," while the second type merely limits the amount of
noneconomic damages that may be recovered.29 This second type
of cap may be used in all types of actions 0 or may be ,limited to
certain specified types of personal injury actions."a
Legislative caps on noneconomic damages have been inspired
in part by the actions of neighboring countries, primarily in areas
like Ontario, Canada.32 According to Galanter, the most "objec-
tionable features of the United States tort system" have been elimi-
nated in Ontario." While recognizing noneconomic harm as a
compensable injury, the Canadian courts have routinely awarded
smaller damage awards.' Canada has achieved strict controls on
claims for nonpecuniary loss by placing a ceiling on all claims for
pain and suffering.35 As reformers focus on measurements of dam-
ages in the tort system, the Canadian system provides hope to the
United States,36  where there were 735 million-dollar verdicts
life as an indication of this expansion).
28. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987) (limiting the "total damages
which may be awarded" in a medical malpractice action to $1,000,000).
29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1992) (limiting recovery of
noneconomic damages in a personal injury action to $500,000).
30. See, e.g., id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (1987) (limiting noneconomic
damages in civil actions to $250,000 unless clear and convincing evidence establishes that
an award up to $500,000 is warranted); MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108
(1989 & Supp. 1992) (imposing a $350,000 limit on noneconomic damages in personal
injury actions); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp. 1993) (imposing a
$500,000 limit on noneconomic damages in most actions).
31. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.1483 (West 1993) (limiting noneconomic
damages in certain medical malpractice actions to $225,000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-
7.1 (1992) (placing a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
actions).
32. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 37
(1986) (commenting on the system in Ontario).
33. Id.
34. Martin, supra note 21, at 326 (noting that the Canadian courts have only awarded
"a half dozen or so million dollar verdicts in the entire history" of Canada's judicial
system).
35. Id. (discussing the famous trilogy of personal injury cases that were decided by the
Canadian Supreme Court in the 1970's and that imposed a limit of $100,000 on nonpecu-
niary damages).
36. Various commentators have asserted, however, that Canada has not solved all of its
problems with the use of damage caps on noneconomic injuries. See, e.g., Phillips, supra
note 26, at 55 (noting that "Ontario, Canada is experiencing a liability insurance availabil-
ity and affordability crisis even though that jurisdiction already has in place many of the
tort changes currently advocated by the insurance industry").
1993]
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awarded in 1990, and 750 million-dollar verdicts awarded in
1991. 37
Currently, state courts have not resolved the issue of capping
noneconomic damages."a Proponents of noneconomic damage caps
argue that damage measurements are completely arbitrary.39 This
lack of predictability is the result of three factors. First, juries are
not provided adequate guidance to determine or measure damag-
37. JURY VERDICr RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK: CUR-
RENT AWARD TRENDS 18-19 (1992).
38. Seven states have upheld the constitutionality of damage caps. See Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 684 (Cal.) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute capping recovery for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions at
$250,000), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Colorado State Claims Bd. v. DeFoor,
824 P.2d. 783, 790-92 (Colo.) (upholding a statute limiting recovery for a single tortious
act by a public entity or employee to $150,000 for one individual and $400,000 for two
or more individuals, with no one person recovering more than $150,000), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 483 (1992); Johnson v. St. Vincent Charity Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598-601
(Ind. 1980) (upholding a $500,000 cap on total recovery for injury or death in medical
malpractice actions); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Services. 789 P.2d 541, 558 (Kan. 1990)
(upholding $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions), overruled
on other grounds by 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991) ; Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102,
114-18 (Md. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute capping recovery for
noneconomic damages in personal injury actions at $350,000); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 536 (Va. 1989) (upholding a $750,000 cap on damage awards in
actions for medical malpractice resulting in injury or death); Robinson v. Charleston Area
Medical Ctr., 414 S.E.2d 877, 888 (W. Va. 1991) (upholding a million-dollar cap on
noneconomic damage awards in medical malpractice actions).
Nine states have rejected these caps. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So.
2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991) (striking down a statute limiting damages in a medical malprac-
tice action); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 1987) (striking
down a state statute limiting noneconomic damages); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp.
Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) (medical malpractice); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (medical negligence); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838
(N.H. 1980) (same); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991) (same); Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988) (same); Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989) (damage awards against state university hospitals in negli-
gence actions); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 728 (Wash. 1989) (noneconomic
damages recoverable in a personal injury or wrongful death action).
39. Martin, supra note 21, at 329; see also James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort
Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J.
ON REG. 171, 176 (1991) (citing JEFFERY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 8-9
(1979), which notes that plaintiffs are generally under or over compensated because "[tihe
operation of the tort system is akin to a lottery"). Punitive damages have also received
considerable attention as one author defined these awards as "essentially the inscrutable
emissions of mysterious black boxes of punishment." OLSON, supra note 21, at 283. But
see PHILIP J. HERMANN, INJURED? How TO GET EVERY DOLLAR You DESERVE, 116-25
(1990) (asserting that jury awards are predictable because juries award damages in accor-
dance with previous awards for similar claims and follow predictable patterns, and because
valid tables for injury values and verdict outcomes are available).
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es.' Standards for measurement are either too broad or nonexis-
tent.41
Whatever the categories of non-economic damages
allowed in a given jurisdiction, the law provides no objec-
tive benchmarks for valuing them. As one commentator
notes, "Courts have usually been content to say that pain
and suffering damages should amount to 'fair
compensation' or a 'reasonable amount,' without any more
definite guide."42
As a result, proponents believe that "the ultimate determination
of... non-pecuniary damage amount[s] remains largely a matter
of arbitrary speculation."43
Moreover, proponents assert that procedural discretion contrib-
utes to this arbitrariness.' The use of general verdicts45 has
meant that decisionmakers "need not explain their rationale or
methods for arriving at a particular award figure, and their findings
are difficult to review."'
Third, proponents also assert that awards are arbitrary because
they are often a function of extrinsic factors such as jury passions
or sympathies, rather than the merit of the claim itself.' The arbi-
40. Blumstein et al., supra note 39, at 912.
41. Id.
42. Bovbjerg et al.. supra note 24, at 912 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 545 (1973)); see also Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d. 713,
718 (NJ. 1958):
There is and there can be no fixed basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule
which will serve as an accurate index and guide to the establishment of dam-
age awards for personal injuries. And it is equally plain that there is no mea-
sure by which the amount of pain and suffering endured by a particular human
can be calculated.
(superseded by NJ. Cr. R. 1.7-1(b) authorizing the use of time-unit arguments in summa-
tions regarding unliquidated damages); Blumstein et al., supra note 39, at 172 (indicating
the need for a common law system of damages that utilizes the doctrines of precedent
and stare decisis because "[t]oday's system for assessing tort damages lacks standards for
uniform assessment, gives its inexperienced juries too little information and too much
discretion, and hence yields extremely variable results . . . . Such inconsistency results in
systemic unfairness and operational inefficiencies.").
43. Martin, supra note 21, at 322.
44. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 915.
45. General verdicts are "single findings of liability with an associated award of all
damages." Idt
46. Id. (noting further that the judiciary does not alter jury verdicts because judges are
not provided with objective standards for assessing damage awards).
47. Martin, supra note 21, at 329.
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trariness of the damage calculations is "exacerbated by a sort of
sympathetic moral hazard that juries face when making awards on
an ad hoc basis and spending money that is not their own. ' 4' Fi-
nally, a jury is susceptible to theories of how losses should be
computed.49 As a result, attorney's presentation of a theory of
how losses should be computed becomes increasingly important."
The arbitrariness of this system leaves "no appropriate methods
of fairly and quantitatively measuring losses for pain and suffer-
ing."5' This system undercuts tort law's deterrent effec 2 and
produces large awards53 which generate high insurance rates.'
Such large awards become punitive in nature and ultimately pro-
vide a windfall to plaintiffs.55 Arbitrary awards violate fundamen-
tal fairness because like cases are not treated alike, and as a result,
such awards "erode general confidence in justice and the integrity
of what has become a very large system for personal injury com-
pensation."56
Opponents of damage caps have focused primarily on the
constitutionality and arbitrariness of damage caps. They raise con-
stitutional challenges pursuant to the Seventh Amendment's right to
a jury trial by arguing that caps on damages interfere with the
jury's power to determine the extent of damages.57 Opponents also
48. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 936.
49. See id. at 914 (discussing the per diem method of damage calculation where
"seemingly inconsequential differences in values per unit of time lead to very large differ-
ences in awards").
50. See id. (indicating that attorneys may present many subjective approaches to
noneconomic damage calculations).
51. Martin, supra note 21, at 329 (citing a common belief of those in support of tort
reform).
52. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 925 (asserting that efficient and effective deter-
rence will be accomplished if awards are consistent and predictable). But see Amelia J.
Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic
Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 324-25 (1991) (asserting in the context of punitive dam-
ages that the unpredictability of awards is actually productive in that it functions as a
better deterrent since tortfeasors are unable to calculate accurately the cost of an activity).
53. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 908. Furthermore, "[olne result of broad jury
discretion and the absence of clear standards is freedom to make very large awards ....
A particular focus of complaint is tort law's ever-increasing willingness to countenance
'pain and suffering' and other such 'intangible' or 'non-economic' damages on an open-
ended basis." Id. at 917.
54. Id. at 918.
55. But see Martin, supra note 21, at 331-33.
56. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 924 (emphasis omitted).
57. See Wiggins & Caldwell, supra note 18, at 732 (concluding that limits on liability
impermissibly intrude upon the jury's right to determine damages). But see James F. Tiu,
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assert that caps violate the right to equal protection under the law
because the caps discriminate based upon the nature of the injury
(i.e., economic or noneconomic).58 Finally, they have challenged
caps based on right of access to the courts under state law and
have, at times, been successful.59
While proponents of damage caps cite the arbitrariness of
awards as the primary justification for placing caps on
noneconomic damage awards, opponents of the limits argue that
these limits are just as arbitrary as the damage awards that they
seek to control." Opponents point to the wide range of damage
caps that have been proposed. Proposed caps on noneconomic
damages have ranged from $150,000 in Texas,6 to $1,000,000 in
Wisconsin.62 These arbitrary caps are particularly unsettling "be-
cause the arbitrary limits come into play only in the most severe
cases."63 In the view of opponents to damage caps these arbitrary
limits result in unfairness and a lack of deterrence. 4
Comment. Challenging Medical Malpractice Damage Award Caps on Seventh Amendment
Grounds: Attacks in Search of a Rationale, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1990)
(concluding that capping medical malpractice awards does not violate the Seventh
Amendment's preservation of the right to a civil jury trial).
For court discussions, see, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 728 (Wash.
1989) (holding that a statutory cap limiting noneconomic damages in personal injury or
wrongful death actions is violative of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Boyd v.
Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986) (discussing a constitutional challenge to
statutory damage caps), rev'd, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
58. Wiggins & Caldwell, supra note 18, at 726-27 (noting that caps may unconstitu-
tionally discriminate against the class of plaintiffs who have been sincerely injured -and,
therefore, are deprived of the amount of jury verdicts that exceed the statutory limit). But
see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1984) (indicating that
capping the amount of noneconomic damages available in medical malpractice cases does
not violate the equal protection clause because the caps achieve the legitimate state goal
of saving money for doctors, insurance companies and consumers), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 892 (1985).
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (finding
that a $450,000 cap violated the state constitutional right of access to courts); Lucas v.
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988) (finding that a $500,000 cap violated the
state constitutional right of access to courts).
60. Phillips, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that "[a] fixed damage figure . . . is as
arbitrary as the uncertainty in amount of recovery it seeks to cure").
61. TFx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.03 (West Supp. 1993) (currently im-
posing a limit of $500,000 on total awards in an action on a health care liability claim
[§ 11.02(a)] with a proposed alternative of $150,000 on noneconomic damages only).
62. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 1992).
63. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 957-58.
64. Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones. Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of
Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 825
(1987).
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Finally, opponents argue that damage caps sacrifice some of
the fundamental principles of tort law. Most notably, "[s]tatutory
caps compromise the traditional principle of full compensation for
both economic and noneconomic loss suffered by a successful tort
claimant."6 In addition, mandatory damage caps remove the indi-
viduality of each claim.'
Without question, the rules governing recovery of dam-
ages in tort cases most clearly reflect the traditional con-
ception of the uniqueness of every tort claim . . . . Evi-
dence of awards made to others who have suffered similar
injuries not only is not binding-it is not even admissible;
the jury does not hear of other awards and cannot consider
them in assessing damages. The principle of individualiza-
tion is so strong, in fact, that a "thin-skull" rule prevails,
under which a plaintiff who is especially susceptible to
injury may recover in full.67
Damage caps have rendered the particular circumstances of the
plaintiff less influential in determining the outcome of the case
and, as a result, have made a strong departure from the traditional
notion of the uniqueness of every tort claim.68 As evidenced by
recent court decisions,69 states have not resolved this dispute uni-
formly.
Although the tort reform controversy continues, this Note is not
an attempt to provide an answer to this controversy. It does, how-
ever, attempt to inspire consideration of another factor, namely the
effect of noneconomic damage caps on women, in order to deter-
mine if these caps are an appropriate solution to what many per-
65. Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary
Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REv. 172, 187 (1992); see also Blake, supra note 8. at 404
(asserting that "[t]he idea behind a tort compensation system is compensation of the
wrongfully injured by the responsible party"); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24. at 909-10
(commenting that "[tihere is universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort law
requires making the successful plaintiff 'whole"').
66. Abraham, supra note 65, at 180-81.
67. Id. at 177-78.
68. Id. at 180.
69. Compare Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n. 592 So. 2d 156, 171 (Ala. 1991)
(rejecting a statute limiting noneconomic damages at $400,000 in medical malpractice
actions as violative of the state's trial by jury and equal protection guarantees) with Mur-
phy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 111-12 (Md. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a
state statute capping recovery for noneconomic damages in a personal injury action at
$350,000).
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ceive is a tort crisis.
I. THE TORT SYSTEM AND WOMEN
While the "relevant tort rules have never been explicitly gen-
der-based,"7 the tort system has traditionally burdened women
and correspondingly benefitted men. 7' This burden has been the
result of the marginalization of claims brought by female plaintiffs.
This process is evidenced by the use of apparently neutral rules
that have burdefied women,72 and in the treatment traditionally
accorded to emotional injuries, such as fright,73 and loss of con-
sortium.74 As a result, gender is an important factor in the opera-
tion of the tort system and, thus, must be considered when analyz-
ing proposals to change the system.
The apparently neutral rules of the tort system have burdened
women in three ways. First, apparently neutral rules are "gender-
biased in their origins or effects, 75  thereby marginalizing
women's claims. The most common example is the "reasonable
person" standard that finds its roots in a "reasonable man" stan-
dard.76 Even with the change of terminology to reasonable person,
the roots are still evident.' This standard burdens female plaintiffs
70. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A
History, 88 MICH. L. Rnv. 814, 815 (1990). But see infra notes 93-98 and accompanying
text (discussing the tort of loss of consortium).
71. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 814 (indicating that the tort system values
property more than emotional security and, therefore, favors men, traditional owners of
property, over women, traditional assignees of emotional work).
72. See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 99-148 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
75. See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a
Toils Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57 (1989) (examining the relationship be-
tween gender and the law).
76. Id. at 57-58 (noting that the reasonable man has been defined as "'the good father
of the family"' and "'the man who takes the magazines at home and in the evening
pushes the lawn mower in his shirtsleeves' and discussing a case in which the court
refused to apply a reasonable man standard to female plaintiffs) (footnotes omitted); see
also A.W. Phinney II, Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading Bowen
v. Gillard, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 151, 176 (1989) ("As long as we live in a society
where men dominate women, objectivity will be by definition male.").
Another area in which neutral rules operate to burden women is in the valuation of
a homemaker's services, which are traditionally undervalued because of the priority the
tort law gives to wage-earners. Finley, supra note 75, at 53-54.
It is important to note that this undervaluation, ironically, produces a bias against
males who wish to recover for the wrongful death or incapacity of a wife. See id. at 52.
77. See Finley, supra note 75, at 59 (arguing that, despite the use of 'reasonable
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because the reasonable person standard ignores the experiences and
capabilities of women." This result is important because "the per-
spective from which both the circumstances and the reasonableness
of the actions are evaluated can be important to the outcome of the
evaluation itself."79 This unfair effect is evident in sexual harass-
ment cases in which standards that are permeated with male myths
of what is mere jest can influence the ultimate conclusion of
whether an offensive work environment exists.80
In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., l Vivienne Rabidue
charged her employer with sexual harassment because of comments
made by co-employee Douglas Henry." The majority opinion de-
scribed Henry as "an extremely vulgar and crude individual who
customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and,
on occasion, directed such obscenities to the plaintiff." 3 More
specifically, the dissent noted that "Henry routinely referred to
women as 'whores,' 'cunt,' 'pussy,' and 'tits.' Of plaintiff, Henry
specifically remarked, 'All that bitch needs is a good lay' and
called her 'fat ass."'" Other male employees in the work environ-
ment "displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women in their
offices and/or work areas, to which the plaintiff and other women
employees were exposed." 5 The dissent went on to describe these
pictures: "[O]ne poster, which remained on the wall for eight years,
showed a prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a
man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling 'Fore.' And one
desk plaque declared 'Even male chauvinist pigs need love."'' 6
Nevertheless, the majority adopted a reasonable person stan-
dard, 7 to conclude that this workplace was not an offensive envi-
person' language, courts measure women's conduct by a standard designed for men).
78. See id. at 58 (arguing that the standard is based on male stereotypes and is not
designed with women's experiences in mind).
79. Id. at 59.
80. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (explain-
ing that a 'reasonable woman' standard is necessary to prevent courts and defendants from
perpetuating male-defined notions of reasonable behavior), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
81. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 615.
86. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 620.
[Vol. 44:197
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES AND THE FEMALE PLAINTIFF
ronment and, thus, did not violate Title VII provisions."s The dis-
sent criticized the use of the reasonable person standard because
this standard presumably includes traditional males myths about ha-
rassment.
Nor do I agree with the majority holding that a court
considering hostile environment claims should adopt the
perspective of the reasonable person's reaction to a similar
environment. In my view, the reasonable person perspective
fails to account for the wide divergence between most
women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of
men .... I would have courts adopt the perspective of the
reasonable victim which simultaneously allows courts to
consider salient sociological differences as well as shield
employers from the neurotic complainant. Moreover, unless
the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the defen-
dants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain in-
grained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the
offenders, in this case, men. 9
As a result, women suffer through the application of a seemingly
neutral rule that becomes "subjective due to its failure to include a
variety of perspectives and experiences."'
Second, women's claims were marginalized because courts
often judged the severity of an injury based upon the gender of the
person who suffered the injury.9 Courts have characterized
women's complaints of injury as emotional complaints and men's
complaints about the same injury as legitimate complaints of physi-
88. Id. at 622.
89. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
90. Finley, supra note 75, at 63. DES cases are another area in which the reasonable
person standard may harm a female plaintiff. In O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d
704, 709 (3d Cir. 1981), a young woman brought an action against the manufacturer of
the DES that was given to her mother during pregnancy. Id. The court held that the
statute of limitations tolled when the action was brought since a reasonable person would
have known of the possible injury three years before the plaintiff brought this action. Id.
at 711. The dissent criticized the majority for failing to consider the "torture of the mind"
that this young woman had sustained upon learning that she had cancer. Id. at 718. The
plaintiff's intense fear emerged from her enduring a radical hysterectomy, lymph node
dissection and partial vaginectomy at age 14, id. at 709, and her reading an article that
described another girl's "moaning in pain with the cancer that was continuing its lethal
spread through her arms, legs, spine and brain.' Id. at 707 n.3. The majority ignored
these considerations when applying the reasonable person standard, thus ignoring the
mindset of the young female and dismissing her cause of action. ld. at 709-11.
91. Chamallas and Kerber, supra note 70, at 816.
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cal harm.' This social construction of emotional harm is most ap-
parent in the history of the tort of loss of consortium, where the
compensation awards were dependent upon the gender of the sur-
viving spouse. When a wife died, a husband was deprived of vari-
ous services, 9' although these services were valued at a lower rate
than a male's services. 9' This construction allowed a husband to
be compensated for his loss because a monetary value could be
easily affixed to the lost services. Thus, the law afforded protection
to this "material" harm. 5 In contrast, when the husband died, the
wife was not deprived of her husband's services, but rather of what
was called "'society and affectionate attention."' 96 This mental
pain could not be given a monetary value. "Mental pain or anxiety
the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the
unlawful act complained of causes [only that mental suffering]
.... "" Thus, the law did not compensate this "mental or emo-
tional" loss, making this cause of action unavailable to women.98
The dichotomy between protected physical injury and the un-
protected emotional injury is also demonstrated by the history of
fright claims where physical injury has often provided the bench-
mark for recovery. Through the late 19th century, emotional injury
92. Finley, supra note 75, at 65 ("[H]istorically, women's complaints of pain or injury
have often been dismissed as emotional or hysterical complaints, while men's complaints
about the same ailment were more likely to be treated as serious physical harm.").
93. Nancy C. Osborne, Note, Loss of Consortium: Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,
15 CUMB. L. REv. 179, 179 (1984) (discussing the husband's legal right to the wife's
performance of the duties and obligations which she assumed when she entered the mar-
riage).
94. See infra text accompanying note 268.
95. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 818.
96. Id. at 817 (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861)); see also
Hodges v. Johnson, 417 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (finding that a wife lost
her husband's society, love and affection, but not his services); Osborne, supra note 93,
at 187 (noting that, prior to emancipation statutes, women were not entitled to the servic-
es of their husbands).
97. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 817 (quoting Lynch, 11 Eng. Rep. at 863).
98. The service rationale was initially rejected as the justification for recovery in a
minority of cases in the 1950's. See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811. 819
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium since a
husband does not render services to the family and household of such a nature that the
law cannot estimate its value), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other
grounds by Smithers & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
914 (1957). The holding of Hitaffer was not widely accepted until the late 1960's. See
Osborne, supra note 93, at 190. By 1970, however, most states allowed the wife to main-
tain a cause of action because the spouses shared equal rights "in the undisturbed con-
tinuation of the marital relationship," rather than in any entitlement to services. Id. at 193.
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could be compensated only if the "fright-based harm were coupled
with a direct physical impact."" This physical impact rule hinged
on the physical versus emotional distinction and was designed to
avoid fraudulent claims."° As a result, a fright-induced miscar-
riage without physical impact resulted in no recovery for a plain-
tiff."°' Eventually, the physical impact rule was replaced by its
modem equivalent, the physical injury rule."02 Under the physical
injury rule a plaintiff was required to "demonstrate that her fright
resulted in physical injury, rather than only mental distress."'0 3
Because the focus was the injury and not the cause of the injury,
the physical versus emotional distinction continued to be critical.
This rule, which most states adopted, was designed to protect
against fraud, allow recovery only for the most serious injuries and
discourage plaintiffs from bringing claims for transient injury."°
A third doctrine that sought to limit liability was the bystander
recovery rule, which "require[d] a plaintiff to prove that her injury
[was] traceable to fear for her own personal safety, rather than fear
or concern for the safety of another."' 5 These stringent limita-
tions produced cases such as Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Sup-
ply."t6 In Amaya, Lillian Amaya watched as her infant son was
killed by a negligent truck driver. 7 Because Amaya was not in
fear for her own personal safety, the California Supreme Court
ultimately denied recovery.0 8
Nevertheless, the California court overruled Amaya when it
99. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 814.
100. Id. at 819-20 (recognizing the protection against fraudulent claims emerged sub-
sequent to the "general legal principle that limited recovery to material, as opposed to
emotional, harms" and prolonged the survival of the impact rule).
101. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896).
102. Chamallas and Kerber, supra note 70, at 820.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 821 (indicating that many jurisdictions disagreed with the effect of this rule,
which was to prevent witnesses of accidents from recovering for fright-induced injury and,
as a result, adopted a zone-of-danger rule through which the determining factor became
"the physical location of the plaintiff rather than . . . the source of the mental distress").
106. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968);
see also Jelley v. LaFlame, 238 A.2d 728, 730 (N.H. 1968) (denying recovery to a
plaintiff who witnessed her child's being crushed by a truck since she was not in danger
of being hit), overruled by Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979).
107. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 514; see also Recent Developments, California Rejects Tort
Action for Fear of Another, 15 STAN. L. REv. 740, 740 (1963) (providing a summary of
the facts of the case).
108. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 517.
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allowed recovery in Dillon v. Legg. " In Dillon, a mother and
sister witnessed their son/brother run down by a negligently driven
truck."0 While the argument could be made that only the sister
was within the zone of danger, the court allowed recovery to the
mother who was safely seated on the porch and, thus, was not in
fear for her own safety."' The court rejected the limitations of
the bystander rule and used a foreseeability test that weighed a
number of factors other than physical proximity."' An important
factor was the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff
and the victim."' This emphasis was apparent in the court's char-
acterization of the case as "the most egregious case of them all:
the mother's emotional trauma at the witnessed death of her
child."".4  While Dillon allowed recovery, this recovery should
have materialized prior to Dillon,"5 and was, unfortunately, an
aberration in light of other cases at the time that sought to limit
recovery based on the physical versus emotional distinction."6
Finally, courts have marginalized claims for emotional injury
by focusing on the person suffering the injury, rather than the
actual injury itself."7 Skepticism in the medical community al-
lowed courts to deny recovery for emotional injury."' One of the
most extensive studies on emotional injury, conducted by Dr.
Hubert W. Smith,' noted the assumption of the court in Victori-
109. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
110. Id. at 914.
111. Id. at 915.
112. Id. at 920.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 925. Dillon has been followed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Villamil v.
Elmhurst Memorial Hosp., 529 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (allowing parents
to recover for emotional distress for the loss of their daughter shortly after her birth even
though the plaintiffs did not allege physical danger or injuries).
115. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 858 ("Why ... did it take so long
for the courts to produce Dillon?").
116. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing the view ihat physical
injury should provide the benchmark for recovery). The historical limitations to emotional
distress and bystander recovery often remain. See, e.g., Sceusa v. Mastor, 525 N.Y.S.2d
101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (denying recovery to a plaintiff mother for psychic dis-
tress arising from the death of her child shortly after birth because the mother did not
suffer a physical injury and was not within the zone of danger and because the risk of
injury to the child was unforeseeable).
117. See infra notes 118-44 and accompanying text.
118. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 826.
119. Id. at 846 (describing the Smith study as "[t]he longest and one of the most fre-
quently cited law review articles on fright-based injury").
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an Railways Commissioners v. Coultas,' "that normal persons do
not suffer injury from fright.'.. While Smith believed that psy-
chic upset could cause injury, he concluded that normal people
experienced only "temporary upset, or fleeting illness. '"" While
Smith did not use the word "male" as synonymous with normal, he
did conclude that pregnancy was a "temporary idiosyncrasy''
and urged courts to follow the proposition that "[a]n actor should
not be required to assume that every female in his path is about to
become a mother."' 24 Moreover, Smith found that emotional inju-
ries "usually involve[d] aggravation of a pre-existing impairment
with the factor of individual idiosyncrasy or susceptibility playing
the dominant role."'" Smith supported this conclusion with a
study in which he examined 301 cases of fright-based injury.126
In 216 of the cases studied, Smith found that the plaintiff pos-
sessed a "preexisting vulnerability."'27  Even while resolving
doubts in favor of claimants, Smith found that "in 175 of the 301
cases ... the described stimulus was medically inadequate to pro-
duce injurious psychic reactions in an average person; in 125 cases
only could it be regarded as probably adequate."'2 As a result,
the abnormal or idiosyncratic person suffered an emotional inju-
ry29 that was found to be more a result of the person than the
actual injury sustained.
Courts have often adopted a Smith-type rationale and treated
emotional injuries as a function of the individual's abnormal re-
sponse to danger.3 ' The rationale that normal people do not suf-
fer emotional injury is apparent in concepts such as remoteness,'
unforeseeability,3 3 and unreasonableness. 3 1 In their article on
120. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
121. Hubert W. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 210 (1944).
122. Id. at 225.
123. Id. at 296.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 225-26.
126. Smith, supra note 121, at 282.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 281-82.
129. Id. at 282 (finding that a "majority of persons claiming injury from psychic causes
possessed sub-normal resistance").
130. Chamallas & Kerber. supra note 70, at 827.
131. IUL at 826-27.
132. Id. at 839.
133. Id. at 816; Smith, supra note 121, at 210 (asserting that courts could deny liability
because of the plaintiff's particular reaction by using these concepts).
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fright-based injuries, Chamallas and Kerber list the "first notable
case involving a claim of fright-based injury"'" as' Victorian
Railways Commissioners v. Coultas.'35 The case denied recovery
to the plaintiff, Mary Coultas, who was frightened when the defen-
dant negligently gave a signal, thus creating an impression that she
would be killed by a moving train.'36 The rationale provided by
the court was that the damages sustained were too remote.'37 To
Chamallas and Kerber, this rationale was "somewhat difficult to
understand ... [and] did not reflect temporal or spatial distance
between the defendant's negligence and Mary Coultas' injuries.
Rather, it classified her injury as remote because of its judgment
that a normal person would not suffer physical injuries as a result
of such an incident.' 38
Other concerns have led courts to believe that the plaintiffs
abnormalities caused the harm. These concerns include the possi-
bility a flood of litigation, potentially fraudulent claims'39 and
problems of causation. 4° For example, in Mitchell v. Rochester
Railway Co., ' the plaintiff sustained a miscarriage when she was
almost hit by a negligently driven horse cart. However, the court
denied recovery for "mere fright" because the miscarriage sustained
was "the result of an accidental or unusual combination of circum-
stances which could not have been reasonably anticipated."'42
Moreover, the court feared that recovery "would naturally result in
a flood of litigation."'43 Many courts believe that these types of
claims are likely to be fraudulent; therefore, the trustworthiness of
the plaintiff becomes an issue."
134. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 826.
135. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
136. Id. at 223.
137. Id. at 226.
138. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 826-27 (also noting the defense counsel's
argument that '"[a] mere nervous shock caused by fright of an impending event which
never happens results from the constitution and circumstances of the individual"').
139. A recent example of this concern with fraudulent claims can be seen in require-
ments such as expert medical testimony or "medically significant" injuries. See, e.g.,
Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 693 F. Supp. 785, 781 (E.D. Mo. 1988) (requiring
medical diagnosis of emotional distress so severe as to be deemed medically significant in
order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
140. Chamallas and Keber, supra note 70, at 827.
141. 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
142. Id. at 355.
143. Id. at 354.
144. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935) (asserting recov-
ery for emotional harm would "open the way to fraudulent claims and enter a field that
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Instead of relying on concepts like foreseeability to deny recov-
ery, some courts have been more explicit in noting that emotional
injury is suffered only by abnormal or overly sensitive people. 45
In Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad,'46 the second major case
acknowledging that "mere fright" was not a legally cognizable inju-
ry, Margaret Spade alleged that she suffered hysterical paralysis
and other ailments when she was frightened by railroad employees
who were forcing two drunken passengers off the train.'47 In de-
nying her recovery, the court did not use terms such as remoteness
and foreseeability. Rather, the court focused squarely on the quali-
ties of the parties and stated that only "a timid or sensitive person"
would suffer a physical injury because of fright.'48 Using such a
focus, the court sought to protect defendants from liability based
on claims brought by ultrasensitive plaintiffs.'
In sum, the tort law has established a strong distaste for emo-
tional or noneconomic injuries and marginalized these claims. Caps
on noneconomic damages reinforce this distaste. As will be dis-
cussed, these injuries are most frequently suffered by and associ-
ated with women; 50 thus, caps on noneconomic damages perpetu-
ate the idea that female plaintiffs alleging emotional injury are
undeserving of compensation. Moreover, noneconomic damages are
especially devastating to women because certain causes of action
are unique to women.' t Because caps on emotional injuries
has no sensible or just stopping point").
145. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision to deny a rehearing of the
previous decision to allow a public figure to recover for the tort of emotional distress
without reputational damage sufficient to sustain a libel count because this extension
would protect "the very persons whose calling requires emotional strength and resilien-
cy . . . [and] . . . reject[s] the rough-and-tumble that defines political life"), denying
reh'g of 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1035 (1936) (where Judge Magruder claims that protection against
the irritations of daily life could be better achieved through a "certain toughening of the
mental hide ... [rather] than the law").
146. 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897).
147. Id. at 88.
148. Id.; see also, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 523
(Cal. 1963) (citing the work of Hubert Smith and the conclusion that most people who
suffer emotional injury have a preexisting disposition to these types of injury).
149. Spade, 47 N.E. at 89 (noting recovery for the fright-based injury would be detri-
mental to business operation).
150. See infra part IV.A.
151. See infra notes 155-63, 225-60 *and accompanying text (discussing pregnancy and
miscarriage in fright-based claims, as well as products liability cases involving the Dalkon
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
would exist in a tort system that has not welcomed emotional
injury and in a society that has undervalued the economic contribu-
tion of women, the impact of these caps on female plaintiffs
should be scrutinized prior to their implementation.
IV. CAPS ON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES: AN OBSTACLE
FOR THE FEMALE PLAINTIFF
Caps on noneconomic damages deny recovery for otherwise
meritorious claims. As discussed earlier, all American jurisdictions
have awarded noneconomic damages specifically designed to com-
pensate an injured plaintiff for nonpecuniary losses.'52 Caps on
noneconomic damages would deny recovery for these very real
injuries. More importantly, when these caps operate, female plain-
tiffs may be the plaintiffs who suffer most.
This section will focus on the following four topics: A) the
association between female plaintiffs and emotional injury claims
and the frequency with which female plaintiffs bring these claims;
B) the way the proposals for caps echo past concerns that have
discounted women's claims; C) the types of cases that have histori-
cally been unique to women, and their relationship to noneconomic
damages; and D) the disproportionate burden that caps will have
on women.
A. Association and Frequency
Emotional injuries are likely to be brought by and associated
with women. As a result, caps primarily affect female plaintiffs.
Moreover, because women are associated with emotional injuries
that are perceived as undeserving of compensation, caps perpetuate
stereotypical views of female plaintiffs as overly sensitive and, in
some instances, abnormal. "Historically ... women have tended to
bring claims for fright-based injuries far more often than for [sic]
men."' 3 An early study, involving forty fright-based negligence
claims, found that thirty-five of the cases involved women."M In
his study concluding that normal people do not suffer compensable
injury from mere fright, Hubert Smith noted that "women predomi-
nated as plaintiffs and that the injuries complained of were often
Shield, Bendictin, and breast implants).
152. Martin, supra note 21, at 318.
153. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 815.
154. Leon Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 761 (1933).
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sex-based, especially in that so many cases involved pregnancy and
miscarriage."' 55 Smith's study also found that the ratio of women
to men bringing fright claims was 5:1.156 Chamallas and Kerber
note that such studies have "created the impression that women not
only dominated the tort [of fright], but that "mere" men might
have a harder time recovering."'57
Even if women do not suffer emotional injury more often than
men, emotional injury is more often associated with women and
traditionally feminine traits. The most direct association is made
between fright and child bearing and rearing.' As Prosser notes
in each of the first three editions of his tort treatise, fright-based
physical injury cases involve miscarriages so frequently that miscar-
riage has come to typify fright-based physical injury.5 9 This view
is not surprising in light of the early perception that hysteria was a
disorder traceable to the uterus, and therefore, unique to wom-
en. 6" Moreover, the mother-child bond eventually justified com-
pensation for fright-based bystander claims. 6' As a result, the
paradigmatic fright claims involve pregnant women who miscar-
ry or mothers who watch as their child is killed.'
63
Tort casebooks also present the association between emotional
injury and undesirable qualities. In his analysis of gender issues as
they relate to tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, Carl
Tobias notes that "the mental distress materials generally and in
specific areas, such as organization, case selection, tone, and em-
phasis, leave the impression that this cause of action implicates
traits traditionally associated with women that have a been consid-
155. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 846-47.
156. Smith, supra note 121, at 280 (finding 248 plaintiffs were female out of the 301
cases studied).
157. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 845. -
158. See id. at 824 (discussing the early historical connection between women and
fright-based claims, focusing on the pregnant plaintiff).
159. WILUAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 34, at 213-14 (1941);
WILuAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 37, at 178 & n.4 (2d ed.
1955); WILLAxM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 55, at 350 & n.80
(3d ed. 1964).
160. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 825.
161. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (discussing Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), which allowed recovery for fright-induced injury where the victim
was not an ordinary bystander, but rather, a mother who witnessed the negligent killing of
her child).
162. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 70, at 824-34 (discussing the established
connection between women and fright in tort law, focusing on the pregnant women).
163. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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ered less admirable, such as being weak, emotional or impression-
able."" Casebooks contain cases that portray the plaintiff, who
claims emotional distress, as "stupid or overly sensitive."'65 The
selection of lead cases perpetuates this stereotype. Tobias notes that
the principal case selected in Prosser's Cases and Materials on
Torts,"'6 is Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida.67 In that
case, the female plaintiff alleged emotional distress as a result of a
grocery store clerk's comment that "you stink to me. '  This
case creates an impression that a hypersensitive plaintiff is pursuing
frivolous 69  or vindictive litigation.' Tobias concluded that,
while "mental distress and the other intentional tort causes of ac-
tion might be viewed as mechanisms that could contribute to the
empowerment of women, [case opinions] discredit[] the mental dis-
tress cause of action.'' As a result, the treatment of mental dis-
tress in the tort casebook creates the impression that "mental dis-
tress litigation is disfavored: you sissy girls just need a tougher
mental hide or tough guys do not bring mental distress suits." '72
Traditional society further connects women to fright-induced
injuries by creating a strong disassociation between emotional inju-
ries and masculinity. Smith, in his famous research on fright, clear-
ly represents this view.
164. Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts Casebook,
18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495, 516 (1988).
165. Id.
166. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 1982).
Tobias notes that Prosser's casebook is "the most widely used series of tort casebooks in
American law schools." Id. at 495.
167. 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958), reprinted in PROSSER et al., supra note 166, at 54.
168. 100 So. 2d at 397.
169. Tobias, supra note 164, at 517.
170. On occasion, courts have described the female plaintiff in a way that questions her
motives for bringing a cause of action.
The plaintiff [a female bringing a claim for sexual harassment under
Title VII against a male co-worker] was a capable, independent, ambitious,
aggressive, intractable, and opinionated individual. The plaintiff's supervisors and
co-employees with whom plaintiff interacted almost uniformly found her to be
an abrasive, rude, antagonistic, extremely willful, uncooperative, and irascible
personality. She consistently argued with co-workers and company customers in
defiance of supervisory direction and jeopardized [her employer's] business rela-
tionships with major oil companies. She disregarded supervisory instruction and
company policy whenever such direction conflicted with her personal reasoning
and conclusions. In sum, the plaintiff was a troublesome employee.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986).
171. Tobias, supra note 164, at 518-19.
172. Id. at 518.
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Males venture into places of peril as much as females
and so are as frequently exposed to [trivial impacts or
psychic stimuli]. But the male is usually the breadwinner;
his thoughts are distracted from his experience by the tasks
of his job, and further, he has much to lose and little to
gain by developing a neurosis. The female is usually at
home, has more time to ponder upon the experience, and
more to gain and less to lose from developing symptoms.
The independent post-accident psychological forces conduc-
ing to neurosis are apt to be more potent in her case.'73
Thus, it is unwise for a man to pursue an emotional injury claim.
It well may be that the male ego is too compromised
by claiming injury through fright, this deterrent to suit
being bolstered by social taboos. After all, one has to face
a jury, and he does not like to become an ass before his
fellow man. A woman's "femininity" is not hurt by such a
claim. A certain amount of fragility is expected and es-
teemed. 74
This strong disassociation has worked against the male plaintiff
who seeks compensation for emotional injury.
[I]t has often been easier for women than for men to re-
cover for nervous shock or the intentional infliction of
emotional distress . . . . Thus, men are not extended the
same right to peace of mind as are women in this regard,
even though that right is something that most people would
regard as generally worthy of protecting. 75
In sum, because emotional injury claims are more likely to be
brought by women than men, caps on noneconomic damage have a
disproportionate impact on female plaintiffs. This impact is magni-
fied because women are closely associated with emotional injury.
B. Echoes of the Past
Proposals for caps on noneconomic damage echo past concerns
and practices that have traditionally marginalized claims for emo-
tional injury. While those concerned about consortium claims and
173. Hubert W. Smith & Harry C. Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L.
REV. 87, 112 (1944).
174. Smith, supra note 121, at 280.
175. Finley, supra note 75, at 65.
2191993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
fright injuries initiated the traditional physical versus emotional di-
chotomy that determined what injuries were compensable, "6 caps
on noneconomic damages continue to support this dichotomy. By
focusing only on noneconomic damages as a solution to the tort
crisis, reformers have given new force to this dichotomy.1" Com-
mentators perceive the liability crisis to be the result of large and
unpredictable damage awards.' Because an award is composed
of both economic and noneconomic damages,179 a cap on total
awards reduces the large verdict and provides predictability since a
potential defendant is assured that the maximum award will not ex-
ceed the statutorily created figure. 8°
Nevertheless, total caps are not the platform of current re-
form.' Viewing pain and suffering as an inducement to liti-
gate, 182  current reformers urge the adoption of caps on
noneconomic damages alone. The President of the Alliance of
American Insurers, Franklin W. Nutter, has candidly noted this lack
of concern with controlling a plaintiffs economic recovery.' De-
fending the tort reform movement, Nutter acknowledges that the
proposed reforms do not seek to limit or cap economic recovery,
but instead are "designed to balance victims' rights to compensa-
tion for true economic loss or injury and to provide a predictable
legal system that those who develop products and those who pro-
vide services can count on for being the standard. ' ' "M The impli-
cation is that intangible losses are not real. An American Law
Institute study on tort liability, signaled by the American Tort
Reform Association as "open[ing] the door to tort reform," also
recommends only limiting awards for pain and suffering. Fur-
176. See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
180. Redish, supra note 12, at 761.
181. Charles Wasilewski, Tort Reform: Courting Public Opinion, BEST'S REV.-PROP.-
CASUALTY INS. EDMON, June 1986, at 14, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Brprop
File.
182. See Kevin Gudridge, Washington Court Lifts Tort Cap, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFIT MGMT. EDITtON, May 15, 1989, at 4, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Nuprop File (quoting one attorney who states that "[w]e are going
to return to a time when many litigants are going to run right past the settlement table
and into the courtroom, where it's a high stakes dice game on pain and suffering).
183. Walsilewski, supra note 181, at 14.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Brian Cox, Tort Study May Open Door to Reform, Observers Think, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFrr MGMT. EDITION, June 3, 1991, at 2,
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thermore, President Bush, in his comprehensive health care reform
program and his Health Care Liability and Quality of Care Im-
provement Act of 1991 proposal, encouraged states to adopt heath
care reforms that would place a cap, only on noneconomic damag-
es. "'86 These proposals do not completely solve the perceived tort
crisis since the total cost to society of our civil justice system is
listed at $132 billion; however, payments for economic and
noneconomic losses only create around half of the cost."s In fact,
payments for economic losses were actually slightly higher than
those for noneconomic losses..88 Nevertheless, many states have
followed the proposals of reformers and have adopted measures to
limit awards for emotional injury, while leaving claims for eco-
nomic harm untouched.189
The distinction between physical and emotional injuries remains
important. As discussed earlier, society's view of emotional injuries
resulted in denial of recovery for such harms.' This denial mini-
mized the importance of the injury sustained. As reformers advo-
cate limiting only noneconomic damages, and as states adopt these
proposals, the marginalization of injuries traditionally associated
with and suffered by women remains. 9'
Caps on noneconomic damages indirectly reinforce traditional
notions that have burdened the female plaintiff. The medical pro-
fession has provided courts with a justification for denying recov-
ery for emotional injuries.9" Currently, reformers are providing
available in LEXIS, Insure Library, Nuprop File.
186. President Offers Congress a Medical Malpractice Reform Bill, LIABILITY WEEK,
July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nwlrts File (Bush's proposal places a
$250,000 cap on such awards); Administration Malpractice Proposal Would Encourage
State Action, Increase Care, BNA PENSIONS AND PROFITS DAILY, May 16, 1991,
available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnapen File.
187. Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. INFO. INST. REP., Jan. 1993, at 1, available
in LEXIS, Insure Library, Iirpts File.
188. Id. (economic losses are 24% of costs, whereas noneconomic losses are 22% of
costs).
189. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1992) (imposing a
limit of $225,000 on noneconomic damages in most medical malpractice actions while not
limiting the total award); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 1992) (imposing a limit
on noneconomic damages of $1,000,000, but not providing an overall limit on the total
award received).
190. See supra notes 92-116 and accompanying text (discussing how social construction
impacted the loss of consortium cause of action and led to the development of the physi-
cal impact and bystander recovery rules).
191. See supra part IV.A (discussing the correlation between emotional injury and
uniquely female claims, especially pregnancy related injuries, as well as the disassociation
of emotional injury and masculinity).
192. See supra notes 118-44 and accompanying text (noting that the focus on peculiari-
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additional justification for this same conclusion. By focusing on the
abnormalities or peculiarities of the particular individual, the insur-
ance industry supports the notion that normal persons do not suffer
emotional injury.'93 Emotional injury is perceived to be the result
of the individual's inability to cope with the stresses of daily
life. 9 4 In a case involving a woman's claim for emotional distress
resulting from remarks about her race and inability to bear chil-
dren, 95 the defense attorney believed such occurrences to be
"very common ... [n]ot something out of the ordinary." Further-
more, the defense "didn't think it gave rise to an injury or
workers' compensation [sic] because everyone feels upset after an
argument with a co-worker . . . In all work life there are some
disagreements."'96 In fact, the court gave this rationale legitimacy
by recognizing that the plaintiff was particularly sensitive and that
the taunting had "aggravated a preexisting emotional instabili-
ty.' 1
97
Likewise, in his critique at the tort system, The Litigation
Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed the Lawsuit,
Walter Olsen discusses Judith Haimes, a plaintiff who charged a
hospital with malpractice.'98 The plaintiff sought damages for pain
and suffering, as well as for loss of earnings. However, Olson does
not classify the injury as an economic injury. Rather, he states that
[p]ain and suffering were only part of the claim. Formerly
Ms. Haimes had conducted seances at which such eminenc-
es as the poet Milton had spoken through her. Now she
said the dye [the source of the malpractice claim] had
ties of individual plaintiffs was a result of the medical community's skepticism of emo-
tional injuries).
193. Cf. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896) (classifying an
injury as remote since a normal person would not suffer physical injury from "mere"
fright).
194. See supra notes 118-44 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 195-205 and
accompanying text (discussing how the focus of non-economic claims is on the individual
plaintiff's abnormalities rather than the action that caused the harm).
195. Kaliski v. Fairchild Republic Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989),
aff'd, 564 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. 1990).
196. Evelyn Gilbert, NY Upholds Workers' Compensation Stress Claim Over Taunting,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFIT MGMT. EDITION, Feb. 18,
1991, at 2, available in LEXIS, Insure Library, Nuprop File; see also Kalinski, 542
N.Y.S.2d at 842 (defendant employer asserting that "the stress the claimant was subjected
to was not more than that normally encountered in a work environment").
197. Kalinski, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (citation omitted)(affirming the Board's decision).
198. OLSON, supra note 21, at 152.
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interfered with the psychic powers that had enabled her to
divine persons' past and future.'
Olson noted that the jury award of $986,000 did not withstand the
trial court's scrutiny because it was ultimately overruled as "grossly
excessive."2 Olson begins a chapter discussing jury awards with
what could be considered an extreme case, thereby focusing the
reader on the perceived abnormalities of the plaintiff, rather than
on the serious injury that occurred.
The concern regarding the abnormal plaintiff is also evidenced
in remedies through which reformers seek to limit the number of
claims for emotional injury. Insurers will acknowledge that claims
for certain emotional injuries may come from legitimate sourc-
es." However, they still believe that emotional injuries can and
should be controlled by focusing on the individual, rather than
preventing the trauma or event that produced the emotional injury.
This strategy has been asserted in the area of work-induced stress
claims. Insurers are quick to assert that the work place's "relation
to the resulting disability may be no more than marginal."''2° As a
result, insurance companies urge employers to adopt programs to
assess employee abnormalities or predispositions to emotional inju-
ry.203 Upon first notice of an employee's allegation of a stress-in-
duced injury, employers are told to:
Investigate immediately. Once an allegation is made or
a problem surfaces, the employer should launch an immedi-
ate investigation conducted by an expert in this type of
claim. The investigation should contain interviews and
statements from supervisors and co-workers, and even
neighbors when appropriate. Civil and criminal index
searches should be performed to obtain information on
possible non-industrial problems and stressors. Copies of all
personnel documents should be obtained . . . . This also
199. Id.
200. Id. at 152-53 (ordering a new trial on these grounds).
201. David 0. Weber, Shrinking the Head Cases; Minimizing Unworthy Mental-Injury
Claims, INS. INFO. INST. REP., July, 1991, at 35, available in LEXIS, Insure Library,
lirpts File.
202. Joseph F. Mangan, Stress-Related Claims: Causes and Controls, BEST'S RE-
VIEW-PROP.-CASUALTY INS. EDITION, March, 1991, at 68, available in LEXIS, Insure Li-
brary, Nuprop File.
203. John W. Jones, Breaking the Vicious Stress Cycle: Accident Susceptibility Factors,
BEST'S REv.-PROP.-CASUALTY INS. EDITION, March 1988, at 74, available in LEXIS,
Insure Library, Noprop File.
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means the employer should investigate tell-tale signs of
pending trouble: mood swings, altercations with other em-
ployees, reports of family or personal problems, and reports
of alcohol or drug problems."
While the goal of eliminating claims for vague and uncertain emo-
tional injuries can be achieved by focusing on the injury itself, this
option is not routinely adopted. °5 By focusing on the individual's
character, the emotional trauma is dismissed as idiosyncratic. As a
result, the plaintiff that brings the suit for an emotional injury is
burdened because the injury is not given the attention it deserves.
By attempting to discredit claims for emotional injury, tort
reformers indirectly blame the individual. Because insurers fear
fraudulent claims for emotional injury, they continue to deny re-
covery for these claims much as the courts had done earlier in tort
history." 6 Insurance companies claim that it is extremely difficult
to separate false from legitimate claims. 7 Reformers request that
emotional injury recovery be denied because its vague symptoms
"provide[] the opportunities for malingering and outright fraud." '
In the context of stress-related injuries, reformers consider the
problem to be particularly prevalent when there is no physical
corroboration for either the stress or the injury.2 As a result,
they support standards for the determination of compensation for
only mental/mental stress claims.210 In further support of using
204. Howard J. Stevens, Stress in California, RISK MGMT., July 1992, at 38, available
in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File; see also, e.g., Weber, supra note 201, at 35
(recognizing while many claims for emotional injuries are legitimate. "many people are
carrying around a lot of psychological baggage. It's really critical to discover the events
from their past that might have sent them over the edge.").
205. See Weber, supra note 201, at 35 (discussing attempts to establish standards that
evaluate certain factors which may give rise to psychological injury).
206. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
207. Rhona L. Ferling, The Link Between Economic Security and Stress, BEST'S
REv.-PROP.-CASUALTY INS. EDITION, Jan. 1989, at 56, available in LEXIS, Insure Li-
brary, Brprop File.
208. Mangan, supra note 202, at 68.
209. Ruth G. Kastrud, Stress Claims: The New Frontier, BEST'S REv.-PROP.-CASUALTY
INS. EDITION, Dec. 1986, at 72, available in LEXIS, Insure Library, Brprop File.
210. Report Urges Review of State WC Plans, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUAL-
TY/RISK & BENEFIT MGMT. EDrION, Oct. 2, 1989, at 34, available in LEXIS, Insure Li-
brary, Nuprop File.
Stress claims, similar to early claims for fright injury, are divided into several cate-
gories depending on the source of the injury and the other injuries that accompany the
stress-related injury. The first category of stress injuries, physical/mental injury, occurs
where the emotional or mental disorder is the result of a physical injury or trauma. A
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potential fraud as a basis for denying recovery, reformers focus on
facts demonstrating the prevalence of fraudulent claims. For exam-
ple, one study found that in "workers' compensation [claimsI
judge[s] dismiss[] nearly twice as many stress claims as all other
types of claims..2 1  Another survey found that Americans be-
lieved that only 15% of civil liability suits were justified, with
36% of those surveyed saying that frivolous lawsuits were respon-
sible for many of the problems that face the insurance industry." 2
Therefore, perceptions of fraud perpetuate the view that emotional
injury claims are less legitimate than physical injury claims.
Modem tort reform focuses on concepts of foreseeability and
causation, thereby continuing to support the notion that the particu-
lar plaintiff caused the emotional injury.2"3 When the New York
Court of Appeals required comprehensive general liability insurance
policies to cover emotional injuries, even where a physical injury
was not present, the American Insurance Association asserted that
"'these are damages that insurers never envisioned would be cov-
ered and never charged a premium for.""'2 4 Furthermore, these
damages "'could vastly increase the number of unanticipated claims
made against []insurers.""'2 5 By focusing on the concept of
unforeseeability,2"6 the claim is again marginalized and recovery
representative example would be the individual who suffers psychological trauma as a
result of the unexpected amputation of a leg. The second category is mental/physical inju-
ries where "psychiatric injury is a physical manifestation of mental stress, such as ulcers,
heart attacks or high blood pressure." Stevens, supra note 204, at 38. This category is
physical injury that results from a psychological cause. The final category of stress-related
injuries is where mental disorders are "caused by emotional or psychological factors-the
so called mental/mental injuries." Mangan, supra note 202, at 68.
while the physical/mental and mental/physical categories rarely provide problems for
insurers, the final stress category, akin to earlier tort claims involving bystanders outside
the zone of danger or claimants suffering emotional injury unaccompanied by physical
injury or impact, has received considerable attention. Mental/mental injuries have been
viewed by "more than one expert . . . as an epidemic," even though these claims account
for only a small portion of all worker's compensation claims. L Unlike physical injuries,
with "well defined symptoms clearly traceable to a single cause," mental/mental injuries
raise concerns due to vague symptoms, multiple causes, and greater opportunities for
fraud. Id.
211. Alfred G. Haggerty, California Workers' Compensation Stress Claims Soar, NAT'L
UNDERWRrrER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RiSKS & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, May 16, 1988, at
6, available in LEXIS, Insure Library, Nuprop File.
212. Gastel, supra note 187, at 1.
213. See supra notes 118-44, 195-205 and accompanying text (discussing the focus
placed on plaintiffs in emotional injury claims).
214. Stacy Gordon, N.Y. Upholds CGL Cover for Emotional Distress, Bus. INS., June
15, 1992, at 3, available in LEXIS, Estate Library, Busins File.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the unforeseeability of emo-
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becomes easier to deny. 7
Current tort reformers echo the same rationales used by earlier
courts to deny recovery for emotional injuries. The focus on
noneconomic damage caps is not only part of this overall move-
ment but it also bolsters the physical versus emotional dichotomy
that has historically burdened women. These continuing practices
are very important since women are traditionally the plaintiffs as-
sociated with emotional injuries.1 8 When tort law adopts the
physical versus mental dichotomy, women suffer. When tort law
continues to discredit particular plaintiffs by focusing on
unforeseeability or fraud, women suffer. Thus, if current tort re-
formers continue to merely echo past tort practices, women will
inevitably suffer.
C. Lessons from History
As has been discussed, certain injuries that consist of large
noneconomic components are traditionally suffered by women. The
effect of noneconomic damages caps on female plaintiffs has not
been addressed in the current tort controversy because there is a
lack of direct evidence on the impact of these caps. One reason for
this lack of evidence is that jury verdicts are often analyzed in
very broad terms, controlling for few, if any, variables. For in-
stance, it is not difficult to find data regarding average awards219
or support for the conclusion that overall jury verdicts increased in
tional injury).
217. Other reasons have been asserted by tort reformers to deny recovery for emotional
injury claims. Often psychological injuries themselves are attacked as being faddish and
are not universally recognized by doctors, and, as a result, appear unworthy of compensa-
tion. Paul R. Lees-Haley, Stress Claims Can Be Deceiving, BEST'S REv.-PRoP.-CASU-
ALTY INS. EDITION, Nov. 1987, at 80, available in LEXIS, Insure Library, Brprop File.
These disorders are characterized as being subject to change by lobbying of certain group.
Id. Thus, the merit of the claim quickly becomes questionable. Also, the judicial system
itself with its sympathy for the plaintiffs, whether that sympathy comes from a judge or a
jury, is seen as a cause of recovery. Gastel, supra note 187, at 1. Both justifications
support the notion that recovery is based on something besides the merit of the claim. As
a result, these rationales have the potential to serve as a proxy for the commonly held
belief that normal people do not suffer emotional injury.
218. See supra part IV.A (discussing the association between female plaintiffs and emo-
tional injury claims, as well as the frequency with which women bring such claims).
219. MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY TRENDS IN TRIALS
AND VERDICT IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1974, at 20 (1982); see also REPORT OF
THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSE, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 36 (1986)
(noting the number of millon dollar verdicts has increased by 1200%) [hereinafter WORK-
ING GROUP].
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tort cases.' Studies that analyze the factors affecting awards
commonly consider race, age, and occupation, but usually ignore
the role of gender." However, when researchers do focus on
gender, awards are not broken down into economic and
noneconomic components. m
Empirical evidence describing the effects of caps on
noneconomic awards is lacking. Therefore, the tort system is best
analyzed not through generalized data and extreme cases,'m but
through the differences in case types.24 Cases involving child
bearing and rearing have appeared consistently throughout the
history of the tort system. Claims relating to pregnancy are pre-
dominant in products liability and medical malpractice cases. Of
the products liability cases litigated in federal district court from
1974 to 1986, an estimated 11,292 claims were directed at the
pharmaceutical and health products industries.' More significant-
ly, most of the increase in this litigation stemmed from the use of
three products. Two of these products were the Dalkon Shield22
and Bendectin,' 7  products only used by women."5  These two
220. Margaret C. Fisk, Verdicts Increased; So Did Settlements, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25,
1993 at S12.
221. See, e.g., RANDALL P. BENSON Er AL., THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLI-
CY IMPLICATIONS 23 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989).
222. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., VALUATION HANDBOOK: ADULTS AS PLAINTIFFS 4
(1987) [hereinafter VALUATION HANDBOOK] (handbooks on personal injury note the rela-
tive value of an injury brought by female or male within a certain age group without
discussing the injury suffered).
223. PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 219, at 20; see also Saks, supra note 8, at 1159
(discussing the role of antedoctal evidence in the torts crisis).
224. At times analyzing specific causes of action does not provide a background to
examine gender and claims for nonemotional harms. For instance, libel awards are com-
posed predominantly of noneconomic harm such as injured reputations rather than out-of-
pockets costs such as earning capacity or medical bills. HENRY R. KAUFMAN, THE COST
OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, 6 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam
eds., 1989). However, research does not tell us what plaintiffs suffer these injuries. Id.
Nevertheless, the injuries to be discussed in the next section have clearly defined plaintiffs
because only women bring products liability or medical malpractice claims for breast
implants or injuries associated with child bearing. See infra notes 225-60 and accompany-
ing text (examining uniquely female products liability cases).
225. TERENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGA-
TION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 38-39 (1988).
226. The Dalkon Shield is an intrauterine contraceptive device found to cause an in-
crease in the incidence of pelvic inflammatory disease and sterility in the women who
used iL Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Products Liability May Be Haz-
ardous to Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 199, 208 (1992).
227. Bendectin is an anti-nausea drug that was used to combat morning sickness and
that was later found to cause birth defects among children whose mothers had used it.
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products accounted for 7000 of the 11,000 suits filed against mem-
bers of the pharmaceutical and health products industries. 9 Use
of the Dalkon Shield resulted in 13,000 lawsuits brought by
300,000 plaintiffs230 against manufacturer A.H. Robins and is con-
sidered to be the primary cause of the increase in products liability
litigation." t At the time the manufacturer went bankrupt, a claim
cutoff was instituted, and the manufacturer paid $3 billion in dam-
ages. 2  One author noted that "[iln all likelihood, further district
court filings relating to the Dalkon Shield will be minimal because
of these constraints. ' 'a 3 Nevertheless, by 1986, 325,000 claims
against A.H. Robins were submitted to the bankruptcy court.'
Likewise, Bendectin produced similar detriment to its manufac-
turer Merrell Dow. Bendectin was "the only prescription drug ever
approved in the United States for the treatment of the nausea and
vomiting of pregnancy." 5 At the time of its withdrawal, it was
sold in 22 countries and prescribed for 25% of pregnant wom-
en.16 Of the remaining 4000 suits against the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, 1300 were against Merrell Dow for the product
BendectinY7
While direct evidence on the impact of caps on noneconomic
damages is lacking, tort reformers cannot ignore the possible im-
pact that these caps will have on female plaintiffs in light of the
history of pregnancy-related claims in tort law and in recent prod-
ucts liability and medical malpractice cases. Products liability and
medical malpractice litigation is primarily responsible for the over-
all explosion in tort litigation.2 3' The large awards are prevalent
Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 317-18 (1992).
228. PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 295 (1991) (noting the third product leading
to the increase was asbestos litigation).
229. DUNGWORTH, supra note 225, at 39-40.
230. Id.; see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER, Er AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE,
STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 10 (1987) (estimating 7500 lawsuits resulted from use of
the Dalkon Shield).
231. DUNGWORTH, supra note 225, at 40.
232. Jackson, supra note 226, at 208 n.62.
233. DUNGWORTH, supra note 225, at 40.
234. HENSLER Er AL., supra note 230, at 10.
235. HUBER & LITAN, supra note 228, at 337.
236. Id. at 338.
237. DUNGWORTH, supra note 225, at 39-40.
238. PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 219, at 24.
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in both products liability and medical malpractice cases.131 Calcu-
lation of the average products liability verdict has ranged from
$275,0002m to $1,850,452." These estimates account for in-
creases in verdicts of over 400% to 900%242 in 10 years, with the
number of millon-dollar verdicts increasing by over 1200%.243
The medical malpractice industry has seen similar results, with
average verdicts rising from $280,00024 to $1,017,716,245 an in-
crease of over 360%. Particularly important is the large percentage
of noneconomic damages that are included in these awards. In the
medical malpractice area, noneconomic damages comprise anywhere
from 27% to 54% of total awards.246 While this data is too ag-
gregated to provide specific conclusions, arguments can be made
that males are affected by similar causes of action. For example,
drugs like Bendectin also affect children who are both male and
female.
Even though most of the litigation involving the Dalkon Shield
and Bendectin has ceased, tort law reformers have the opportunity
to have a significant effect on noneconomic damages in a new area
of products liability problems involving breast implants. The impact
of one product cannot be discounted. Authors have noted that
"there is great[] potential for a substantial volume of litigation to
arise around one product in [the pharmaceutical] industr[y]." '247
Moreover,
[T]he pharmaceutical industry group as a whole is also
likely to experience low filing levels unless other products
such as the Dalkon Shield or Bendectin comes along. This
possibility cannot, of course, be ruled out . . . . If only a
small percentage of these consumers experience injuries that
they believe, rightly or wrongly, to be associated with use
of the product, an "epidemic" of lawsuits can rapidly en-
sue.
248
239. Id.
240. lId
241. WORKING GROUP, supra note 219, at 35-36.
242. Id.; HENSLER Er AL., supra note 230, at 19.
243. WORKING GROUP, supra note 219, at 39.
244. MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES. 1959-1980, xiii (1983).
245. WORKING GROUP, supra note 219, at 35-36.
246. Id. at 39 n.38.
247. DUNGWORTH, supra note 225, at 51.
248. Id. at 41.
2291993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Problems resulting from the use of breast implants have triggered
this new epidemic. On December 23, 1992, a jury awarded $25
million against a subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. in Texas'
first civil lawsuit against the manufacturer of silicone breast im-
plants.2 49 The plaintiff, 45-year old Pamela Johnson, received two
sets of implants in 1976 and 1989."o As a result, Ms. Johnson
suffered from auto-immune disease."5 The award consisted of
$20 million in punitive damages. 2 As a result, the clerk's office
in the county that awarded the verdict was "swamped with a flood
of breast implant lawsuits." 3  In the last week of 1992, the
clerk's office received over 150 breast implant complaints and was
"[a]nticipating a torrent of litigation."'  With the precedent set in
Johnson, large and numerous awards are inevitable. 5 In light of
past tort practices, reformers must examine proposals to implement
damage caps from the perspective of a female plaintiff. 5
Causes of action relating to the child bearing process itself also
deserve special attention since child bearing is traditionally associ-
ated with emotional injury claims that are exclusive to the female
plaintiff. 7 Recent reports of the five largest awards for medical
249. Johnson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 91-21770 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 1992).
250. Gary Taylor, Breast Implant Suits Pouring In, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 3, 30.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id.
255. Taylor, supra note 250, at 30 (quoting a Texas attorney as saying "This verdict
should make the manufacturers look at their whole cards. They will get their butts
kicked.").
256. Sexual harassment is another area that should encourage proponents of damage
caps to examine the impact of these caps on female plaintiffs. Sexual harassment is pre-
dominated by female plaintiffs. For an excellent discussion of the sexual harassment of
women see generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOM-
EN (1979). Reports indicate between 42% to 84% of female federal employees experience
sexual harassment. Janice Goodman, Sexual Harassment Laws Face Lax Enforcement,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1993, at 17. Over 60 percent of female associates and partners in
the country's top 250 law firms have reported job-related sexual harassment. Id. at 17-18.
Likewise, an ABA Survey of 3,000 female lawyers surveyed by the Young Lawyers Divi-
sion indicated that 85% have faced sexual harassment. Id. at 17. Caps continue to be an
obstacle in sexual harassment cases. "[L]imitations on recovery of damages for emotional
distress absent physical injury prevent[] sexually harassed women from recovering even
though the barrage of offensive remarks and conduct they [have] to endure [is] obviously
damaging to their mental health." Finley, supra note 75, at 55. While sexual harassment
may produce economic injury, a woman is "still ... emotionally and physically dam-
aged." Id. at 56. Nevertheless, caps continue to place restrictions on recovery for emotion-
al harms, and thus, impact female plaintiffs.
257. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text (discussing the association between
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malpractice included four claims associated with child bearing or
rearing, and all four are comprised of large noneconomic damage
awards. z8 For example, one case involved three-month old
Brandan Briggs, who was admitted to a hospital for a catherization
that revealed a congenital heart defect.29 The child was placed in
an oxygen device and was negligently removed, thus causing him
to sustain severe brain damage from oxygen deprivation." While
the child received damages, his mother also received noneconomic
damages in the amount of $1.25 million for "damage to the parent-
child relationship."261
D. Existing Burdens
The impact of caps on noneconomic damages will impact
women disproportionately since women currently are awarded lower
overall damages in comparison to their male counterparts. Caps on
noneconomic damages, therefore, have a harsher effect on a female
plaintiff who brings a claim that is already economically underval-
ued. Damages awarded to females are consistently lower than those
awarded to males in the same age group.262 This disparity is
greatest when the plaintiffs are between the ages of fifty and fifty-
nine.263 In this group, the average verdict for a male is $423,338,
while the average for a female is $58,074.2" This disparity can
be attributed in part to the valuation of economic damages. Be-
cause noneconomic damages are often undervalued, the valuation of
economic damages becomes increasingly important to a female
plaintiff who is incapacitated and requests compensation for servic-
es.
Theoretically, "[t]here are no formal differences in appraising
economic losses for men and women insofar as the losses arise
because of the destruction of wage and salary income.""2 Never-
theless, economic valuations separate future earning into five cate-
gories, two of which are earnings of the businessman and the
emotional injury and pregnancy).
258. Fisk, supra note 220, at S10-12.
259. Id. at S12.
260. Id.
261. L.
262. VALUATION HANDBOOK, supra note 222, at 4.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH: ECONOMIC HANDBOOK
225 (1979).
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housewife." Moreover, differences in valuations result from sex
discrimination in wages. Women working out of the home earn
approximately 59-630 for every dollar earned by a male in a com-
parable position.67 The economic valuation of services of a fe-
male working within the home is even more alarming.
Even though the caretaking services rendered by the
woman may be extremely specialized and time-consuming,
and may deprive her of independence, economic opportuni-
ty, and leisure time, she is not regarded as suffering an
injury. The idea that a woman renders caretaking services
out of love and devotion as part of her natural role pre-
cludes recognition of the woman's economic and personal
sacrifice. Moreover, the labor and sacrifice involved in
''women's work" is frequently unappreciated because much
of it does not involve wage loss for the person doing the
work.26
8
Undervaluation and sexual stereotyping "can affect projections
of future income [and] basing damages on future income can dis-
advantage women in an economy where they are on the whole
paid significantly less than men."269 As the tort system favors
"pecuniary injuries over lasting emotional scars,"27 the undervalu-
ation of women's economic services increases the differential in
verdicts awarded to female and male plaintiffs.27' Caps on
noneconomic damages will further contribute to this disparity.'
In sum, noneconomic damages have the potential to affect
women significantly since claims for noneconomic damages are
often brought by and associated with women. Echoes of past tort
practices reinforce concepts that traditionally burdened female
plaintiffs. Moreover, many prevalent product liability and medical
malpractice cases are unique to women. Finally, the impact of
266. Id. at 53.
267. THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: AN
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14 (1985).
268. Finley, supra note 75, at 53-54.
269. Id. at 51.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. It must be noted that noneconomic caps and the undervaluation of economic ser-
vices of women will prove to be detrimental to male plaintiffs in one area: a husband's
claim for the wrongful death of his wife. Lower economic awards will reduce the future
earning potential of the women, and thus, reduce recovery to a widower. See Finley,
supra note 75, at 52.
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these caps is magnified since women receive significantly lower
damage awards than men.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort law faces the challenge of solving the so-called tort crisis.
Through the use of damage caps on awards for emotional injury,
the insurance industry hopes to provide an answer. Nevertheless,
proponents of damage caps cannot ignore the history of the tort
system as it relates to the female claimant. As empirical evidence
of the impact of these caps on noneconomic damages on women is
lacking, the treatment accorded to certain subcategories of
noneconomic harm, such as those causes of action relating to preg-
nancy, must be examined closely before implementing this reform.
Because caps on noneconomic damages are supported by the same
reasoning responsible for past denials of compensation for
noneconomic injuries, they will perpetuate the marginalization of
women's claims. Therefore, reformers must examine the impact of
caps on noneconomic damage awards before this "solution" be-.
comes yet 'another problem for the female plaintiff.
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